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ABSTRACT
Evidence is presented of how the Great Recession affected prioritisation of
environmental protection. World Values Survey data from both before the
recession’s onset and its aftermath shows that increases in unemployment
rates had significant, negative effects upon prioritisation of environmental
protection while changing growth rates or gross domestic product (GDP) had
none. These results hold not only among advanced industrial democracies, but
also generalise to Latin American countries. Additionally, the findings offer no
evidence that the recession changed the way in which individual wealth relates
to the prioritisation of environmental protection. As a strong environmental
public opinion is an important factor in the successful implementation of
environmental policy, the findings suggest that, if policymakers wish to main-
tain public support for implementing environmental protection measures, they
should prioritise low unemployment over economic growth.
KEYWORDS Economic recession; environmental attitudes; unemployment; public opinion; World Values
Survey
Introduction
The Great Recession of 2008 was unprecedented in both its suddenness and
its scale. Comparable to the Great Depression (Almunia et al. 2010), it
resulted in a dramatic decline in economic fortunes at both the individual
and country levels creating a vicious circle in which reduced consumer
demand and lower production went hand-in-hand and unemployment spir-
alled. This adversely affected not only those who lost their jobs – with the
associated financial hardship reflected in rising poverty, debt and bankruptcy
for many families – but also those who remained employed while facing
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higher levels of job insecurity and declining wages (United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2011). Not all countries were
equally affected, however, and some saw improvements in their economic
fortunes (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2011). With a large amount of variation in
macro-economic conditions, the aftermath of the crisis provides the ideal
opportunity to investigate how changes in economic conditions may affect
the prioritisation of environmental protection.
Evidence suggests that the crisis may have affected individuals’ environ-
mental protection preferences with a notable decline in environmental con-
cern and an increase in climate change scepticism in the final years of the
decade (Ratter et al. 2012). Coinciding with the financial crisis, scholars have
hypothesised that the two phenomena could be related. A special
Eurobarometer (2009, p. 16) report states: ‘it is again likely that the perceived
seriousness of the economic downturn has led to a decline in the level of
concern for climate change’. As individuals only have a limited amount of
concern that they need to divide amongst competing priorities, increased
insecurity may have caused a downwards shift in their prioritisation of
environmental issues while they focused on the economic and financial
needs of themselves and their country. Though some of this decline in pro-
environment attitudes occurred prior to 2008 and could be unrelated to
macro-economic circumstances, Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2009) remark
that the global economic crisis appears to have exacerbated this.
Understanding this relationship further has important political implications.
Public support for environmental protection is vital for facilitating legislative
attention to address environmental problems as it lends environmental groups
the credibility to claim they represent the public interest and acts as a resource
for lobbying for new legislation or pressing for effective implementation of
existing legislation (Dunlap 1991, p. 286). If leaders know that their electorate
favour (environmental) policies, they are also more disposed to introduce them
to increase their probability of retaining office (Anderson et al. 2017, p. 3). The
converse is also true however as, given that governments cannot address all of
the complex problems that societies face (Krosnick et al. 2006), they are unlikely
to introduce environmental legislation in the absence of a strong pro-
environment public opinion when there is no electoral incentive to do so. If
governments go ahead with a top-down approach without bottom-up support,
this is ‘very likely to fail on grounds of both effectiveness and legitimacy’ (Hurrell
2007, p. 237). Thus, by improving our understanding of how and under what
circumstances economic conditions affect the prioritisation of the environment
among the public, we can learn more about the contextual conditions that are
conducive to developing environmental support, which then has important
implications for the successful implementation of environmental policies.
Here, I make a number of advances to this literature. Firstly, analysis on
the relationship between economic conditions and environmental protection
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attitudes has predominantly focused on the US and Europe, but I expand it to
include a broader array of countries to test the generalizability of the results.
Secondly, while there is a considerable literature on the effects of the reces-
sion on public opinion on global warming and climate change, there is less
research on its effect on environmental attitudes more broadly. This is
important as both the topic of environmental protection used and the way
in which environmental protection is expressed or measured in surveys can
lead to very different conclusions on the state of environmental attitudes
(Dunlap and Emmet Jones 2002).
I also investigate if changes in environmental attitudes are sensitive to
different economic indicators. Economic indicators not only capture differ-
ent economic phenomena, but individuals may also respond differently to
changes in each. This literature, however, has a tendency to choose
a particular economic indicator as capturing a broader ‘state of the economy’
without justifying theoretically why it is the most appropriate one to use or,
where justifications are provided, to not empirically test whether they are
correct. As such indicators are not functionally equivalent, this may lead to
incorrect inferences on the effect of worsening economic conditions on
environmental attitudes given the possibility that one may reach an alter-
native conclusion with a different indicator. I find that changes in unemploy-
ment rates are particularly important. Finally, I examine whether the changes
in macro-economic conditions resulting from the 2008 recession affected the
way in which individual financial circumstances relate to environmental
protection preferences.
For my analysis, I use data from waves 5 and 6 of the World Values
Survey (WVS) (Inglehart. et al. 2015) covering the periods 2004–2007
and 2010–2014 respectively. Though this is a relatively short period of
time, both economic conditions and environmental attitudes witnessed
notable shifts between these periods, so it is an ideal timeframe to
analyse the questions of interest. I limit the countries I use to those in
Western Europe (Cyprus, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden),
Eastern Europe (Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine), South America
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay), North America (Mexico,
United States), Australasia (Australia, New Zealand), plus a small num-
ber of Asian countries (Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea). These are
countries where awareness of global warming and climate change is
almost universal, which is not the case in Africa and most of Asia
(Pugliese and Ray 2009, Lee et al. 2015); Rohrschneider et al. (2014)
also demonstrated that increased affluence in traditionally low-income
countries in the sample facilitated the emergence of a similar environ-
mental attitudes structure between them which permits comparative




Environmental protection is widely regarded as desirable and, in some
respects, achieving a clean and healthy environment is a valence issue
(Clarke et al. 2009, p. 5). At the same time, agreeing in principle with
environmental protection does not necessarily equate to strong support
especially when it is perceived to conflict with economic needs. While
economic needs are important for individuals even during periods of regular
economic activity, they are ‘more likely to dominate other issue concerns
under conditions of economic recession, volatility and economic under-
development’ (Singer 2011, p. 284).
Some scholars have presented environmental protection as a ‘luxury good’
which may be attractive when the economy is doing well, but whose prior-
itisation is overshadowed by higher-order economic needs during times of
economic instability (Abou-Chadi and Kayser 2017). Given that environ-
mental degradation often occurs too slowly for individuals to notice change
occurring and may be perceived as a non-immediate problem (Kollmuss and
Agyeman 2002, p. 253), individuals may rationally calculate that society
should deprioritise environmental protection to focus on the economy.
The postmaterialist thesis of Inglehart (1983, 2008) also posits that recessions
can have an adverse effect on postmaterialist values – of which he identifies
environmentalism to be a component – as they may temporarily lead indi-
viduals to prioritise material concerns. Additionally, during economic con-
tractions, the media are less likely to report on environmental issues due to
increased coverage of economic issues, which may contribute towards
explaining why individuals may be less concerned about the environment
during recessions (Carmichael and Brulle 2017).
Following such theoretical expectations, a number of studies resulting
from the 2008 crisis have examined the effect of changing economic condi-
tions on attitudes toward environmental protection. US data suggest that an
increase in unemployment has a negative effect on people’s climate change
concerns (Brulle et al. 2012) and prioritisation of government action on
global warming (Kahn and Kotchen 2011). In Europe, studies find that
increasing unemployment rates negatively affect belief in climate change
(Scruggs and Benegal 2012) and decreasing economic growth rates nega-
tively affect being worried about it (Shum 2012). Using data from the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), Dalton and Rohrschneider
(2015, p. 528) conclude that there are ‘subtle signs that the economic reces-
sion has diminished support for environmentalism’, though, on balance,
other contributors to that special issue of Environmental Politics (24 [4]
2015) find that environmental concerns among the public were resilient –
at least in Western Europe – as individuals’ environmental preferences
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continue to relate to their vote choice in a setting in which parties’ environ-
mental platforms remained largely unchanged.
In contrasting studies that use US data, Krosnick and MacInnis (2012,
p. 15) find that ‘no evidence supported the hypothesis that people living in
states with economies that were struggling more1 manifested larger declines
in [global warming mitigation] policy endorsement’. Mildenberger and
Leiserowitz (2017) find no evidence using panel data from 2008 and 2011
that changing individual economic fortunes or local economic conditions
affected prioritisation of global warming and point instead to the effects of
shifting political cues. Panel data analysis of New Zealand data from 2002 to
2008 also suggests that neither changing economic perceptions nor changing
household financial circumstances account for the observed decline in envir-
onmental protection attitudes (Kenny 2018a). While challenging the pre-
vious literature, these papers do not eliminate the possibility that the
recession could have played a role in diminishing environmental attitudes
but suggest that – if it did – it may not have been through directly increasing
feelings of economic insecurity per se but by altering public discourse so that
environmental issues are crowded out (Downs 1972).
Finally, there are insights from papers using experimental data. Analysing
US and German cross-sectional data, Kachi et al. (2015) find no effect of
regional unemployment rates on various indicators of support for action on
climate change in either country, however more positive economic percep-
tions have a small positive effect in the US though not in Germany. Their
online survey experiment, which attempted to alter respondents’ perceptions
of the state of the US economy, found no effects of the treatment on their
climate change indices, though they note that this may be due to the failure of
their manipulation to work. A question-order survey experiment in Britain
overcomes this by manipulating the salience of respondents’ own economic
perceptions and demonstrates a link between macro-economic perceptions
and prioritising urgent action on climate change (Kenny 2018b).
One of my contributions is to analyse the effect of changes in three
different indicators given that there are reasons to expect that individuals’
attitudes may respond differently to each: gross domestic product (at pur-
chasing power parity) per capita (GDP PPP PC), growth rates, and unem-
ployment rates. Firstly, the absolute level of growth in a country’s per capita
income may play a role with increasing levels of GDP being associated with
increased prosperity and economic security which, in turn, may lead to
changing societal values which put lower priority on economic needs
(Inglehart 2008). Secondly, the change in the given rate, rather than the
levels, of economic growth may also be important. If a country is experien-
cing high economic growth it may signal a healthy and buoyant economy
and thus act as a heuristic for economic security. However, higher economic
growth does not necessarily make the average citizen feel more economically
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secure and may even increase economic insecurity if such growth comes at
the expense of job security (Duch and Taylor 1993, p. 752). If the former is
the case, one would expect increasing economic growth to correlate with an
increase in environmental concern; if the latter, one would not expect such
a relationship. Additionally, economic growth by itself is not necessarily
good or bad; individuals when making evaluations may benchmark by
comparing with rates over time as well as with rates in neighbouring coun-
tries (Kayser and Peress 2016, 90/91).
There are good reasons to believe that changes in environmental concerns
would be particularly sensitive to changes in unemployment rates. Higher
unemployment rates lead to heavier societal burdens in the forms of shrink-
ing tax revenue and increased government expenditure on unemployment
insurance and social programmes (Goldsmith et al. 1996, p. 333). They are
also extremely important to the public as ‘perhaps no single indicator carries
as much weight in the public mind as the unemployment rate – monthly
unemployment numbers provide a widely publicized and easily understood
measure of how hard times are’ (Borges et al. 2013, p. 398). Scruggs and
Benegal (2012, p. 510) similarly advocate unemployment as the most appro-
priate economic indicator due to it being vital for household material well-
being and happiness, whereas very small segments of the population – at
least in the US – have disproportionally benefited from the positive effects of
economic growth. Evidence from Britain in the aftermath of the recession
also suggests that higher unemployment rates affect voter preferences, while
growth and other economic attitudes may not (Clarke et al. 2016, 144/145).
I also investigate whether the crisis altered the relationship between
individual characteristics and environmental attitudes, a question that has
received little attention. There is a robust list of individual characteristics that
correlate with an environmental disposition, including having a higher
income, belonging to the middle or upper classes, being a woman and
being highly educated (Gifford and Nilsson 2014).
It is possible that the crisis affected how individual characteristics relate to
support for environmental attitudes, with prior literature giving reasons to
believe that the relationship between income and prioritisation of the envir-
onment may be altered. As Figure 1 displays, macro-economic and micro-
economic conditions are related, and evidence suggests that both may in turn
affect environmental attitudes. However, what warrants further investigation
in light of the 2008 financial crisis is the remaining arrow: whether changing
macro-economic conditions alter the way in which micro-economic condi-
tions affect environmental attitudes. As changing macro-economic circum-
stances may differentially affect different segments of society, it is plausible
that individual-level characteristics that are related to environmental atti-
tudes during regular economic circumstances may alter during a recession.
Buttel (1975) hypothesises that the most vulnerable will be the first to
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deprioritise environmental protection when economic conditions worsen.
Alternatively, during a recession higher-income individuals may see a larger
relative drop in their resources and standard of living especially if there is
a safety net of a welfare system for lower-income households. Cooper’s
(2014) qualitative study of Silicon Valley families during the recession
provides for such a psychological effect: she found that better-off families
were constantly worried that their plentiful resources may not provide them
with enough security. From this, one might expect larger declines in envir-
onmental attitudes among these groups during the recession than during
more regular times when they would be expected to be amongst the biggest
proponents.
Of particular note is a study by Jones and Dunlap (1992) which, using
annual surveys, examined whether the social determinants of support for
environmental protection in the US changed from 1973–1990.2 While most
social determinants of support remained the same, contrary to their expecta-
tions they found that during the second oil crisis those higher on the socio-
economic scale – measured by household income and occupational
prestige – saw the direction of their coefficients change so that they were
negatively associated, albeit at a statistically insignificant level, with environ-
mental support. Following the end of the crisis, both these characteristics
returned to being positively associated with environmental support until
1990, when their analysis ends. This points to the potential importance of
a change in economic conditions rather than absolute levels for
Figure 1. Environment attitudes and economic conditions.
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environmental prioritisation and how an economic crisis may have differ-
ential effects on different segments of society. In particular, it provides an
indication that higher income groups may show a greater reduction in their
support for environmental protection during a severe economic crisis, but
that they may update their priorities once the crisis dissipates.
With the severity of the 2008 economic crisis, it is reasonable to assume that,
if an economic recession is going to impact upon environmental attitudes, it
would occur here. Using data from the 2010 General Social Survey, Newman
and Fernandes (2016) find that having a higher income has no impact on being
willing to make environmental sacrifices. Using an environmental index com-
bining indicators of concern, behaviour, agency and scientific advances from
the 2010 ISSP, Franzen and Vogl (2013) find that individuals’ equivalent
income3 within a country is positively and significantly associated with their
environmental index score. While these studies at a particular moment in time
are important, without comparing post-crisis data with equivalent data from
before the crisis, one cannot ascertain the effect of the crisis itself. Conroy and
Emerson (2014) investigate the interaction between macro-economic condi-
tions and individual-level circumstances in the US from 1974–2012 and find
that having higher incomes offsets the negative effect of recessions on prefer-
ences for environmental spending. However, there is a lack of cross-national
research on this question in light of the 2008 recession. Given that the literature
suggests that either lower or higher income individuals could see
a disproportional decrease in their environmental attitudes with decreasing
economic conditions, I create a hypothesis for each scenario.
Based on this literature, I test the following hypotheses:
H1a: As unemployment rates increase, support for the prioritisation of
action to tackle environmental protection should decrease.
H1b: As economic growth decreases, support for the prioritisation of action
to tackle environmental protection should decrease.
H1c: As GDP per capita decreases, support for the prioritisation of action to
tackle environmental protection should decrease.
H2a: As economic conditions decline, individuals with lower incomes will
see a greater decline in their prioritisation of environmental protection.
H2b: As economic conditions decline, individuals with higher incomes will
see a greater decline in their prioritisation of environmental protection.
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Data
I use data from waves 5 and 6 of the WVS (see Table 1 for the full list of
countries). My dependent variable asks respondents to choose between
prioritising protecting the environment even if it causes slower economic
growth and some loss of jobs (1) or prioritising economic growth and job
creation even if the environment suffers to some extent (0). Responses to this
question recorded as ‘missing’, ‘don’t know’, ‘no response’ or ‘other’ have
been treated as missing variables. This is the only environmental question
capturing a trade-off dimension to be included in both waves.
It is important to recognise that this is one particular dimension of
environmental protection that taps into a distinct judgment and has
integrity in its own right (Daniels et al. 2013), but it should not be
taken to represent the whole of the multifaceted nature of environmental
attitudes. In the context of previous waves of the WVS, scholars for
instance have shown that the trade-off question between the environment
and the economy behaves differently to questions capturing a willingness
to make personal sacrifices for the environment (Dunlap and York 2008).
Given that this trade-off question captures an extremely strong commit-
ment to environmental protection, as it makes it clear in this hypothetical
scenario that one cannot further both environmental protection and
economic growth policies concurrently, I can make inferences on the
prioritisation of environmental protection.
For independent variables, I utilise a mixture of individual and con-
textual level variables. The first individual-level variable is household
income where individuals indicate which income decile – within their
own country – their household income falls under on a scale from 1
(lowest) to 10 (highest). I use this as a continuous variable, recoding the
responses ‘don’t know’, ‘missing’ or ‘no answer’ as missing. There is
a measurement issue here as respondents in some countries were given
the specific values of the incomes associated with each bracket whereas in
other countries respondents had to make a subjective self-placement for
which income decile they thought they would be in (Donnelly and Pop-
Eleches 2018). Thus, as a robustness test, I also ran the models using the
related subjective social class variable which I coded in the analysis as
‘lower/working’, ‘lower-middle’ and ‘upper-middle/upper’. Next, I include
a number of demographic variables that have been shown to relate to
environmental protection (Gifford and Nilsson 2014). These are: educa-
tion, categorised as ‘no formal education’, ‘elementary and below’, ‘incom-
plete secondary’, ‘complete secondary’, ‘incomplete university’ and
‘complete university’; age, categorised as 18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54,
55–64 and 65+;4 and gender, categorised as female (0) and male (1).5
Finally, I add employment status with the categories: working full-time,
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working part-time, self-employed, retired, housework, student, unem-
ployed and other. I use three macro-economic variables which I take
from the World Bank (2015) database: unemployment rates, GDP growth
rates and GDP PPP PC.
Results
To start, I present descriptive statistics on how levels of environmental
support changed across countries from before the recession to its after-
math. Table 1 shows the percentage of people in each country who
would choose to prioritise the environment6 in the pre-recession wave
followed by the percentage point change from this baseline in the post-
recession wave. In each case, the point estimates have confidence inter-
vals of no more than ±3.5%.
While the country-mean level of prioritisation for environmental protec-
tion among those who expressed a priority7 is 57% in the pre-recession wave,
there is notable variation among countries, ranging from just over 40% in
South Korea and Hong Kong to 77.5% in Argentina.
Table 1. Percentage and percentages point changes of respon-
dents between waves 5 & 6 that would prioritise environmental




Wave 6 – wave 5
Recession aftermath
2010-2014
Hong Kong 40.42% +20.94%
Uruguay 50.53% +20.17%




















* Argentina did not have the key question on household income asked in
this wave, and so, while the country is included in the initial macro-




























































I am primarily interested in the change in environmental prioritisation
from the pre-recession wave to the post-recession wave. The change varies
from country to country in both direction and magnitude. Prioritisation of
environmental protection decreased in 14 countries and increased in seven,
although in 5 of these the magnitude was less than two percentage points
while another 3 cases recorded a change of more than 20 percentage points.
The countries that saw the greatest increase are those that had a low baseline
to begin with. So, while the overall direction of the change was downwards,
there is visible cross-country variation.
Following the literature review, one would expect that this variation could
be at least partly accounted for by being exposed to different economic
conditions whereby countries that had experienced the greatest economic
difficulties would have witnessed the biggest decrease in environmentalism.
Figure 2 shows the change in environmental protection prioritisation in each
country from the two waves plotted against the raw change in each county’s
unemployment rates, growth rates and GDP PPP PC, from the respective
years in which the countries’ survey data was collected.
The figure for the change in unemployment rates demonstrates a strong
relationship. In countries where the unemployment rate increased most,
individuals’ environmental protection score decreased accordingly. No
country saw an increase in unemployment rates accompanied by an increase
in levels of prioritisation of environmental protection, and Argentina is the
only country where a noticeable decrease in unemployment rates was accom-
panied by a decrease in environmental prioritisation. We could attribute this
anomaly to the Argentinian statistics institute misreporting economic data
(The Economist 2016). The line for unemployment itself is remarkable in
both its slope and in almost passing through the point (0,0). One may
wonder whether the extreme conditions witnessed in Spain have driven
this, though when one removes Spain from the calculation of the fitted line
the slope barely changes. While increases in a country’s GDP PPP PC display
a strong, positive correlation with increases in prioritisation of environmen-
tal protection, increases in the given growth rate are only weakly correlated.
This descriptive analysis provides support for hypotheses H1a and H1c,
though only very weak support for H1b.
There are primarily two different methods available for the main data
analysis: the first is a country fixed-effects logistic regression using a country
dummy variable where the standard errors are clustered at the country level;
the second involves using multilevel modelling techniques for logistic depen-
dent variables in which the country is used as the higher-order variable
allowing for random-effects due to shared common country-level factors
and country fixed-effects for the independent variables. I have undertaken
both and there is little substantial difference between them. I have chosen to
report only the multilevel models given space constraints.8
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These models are presented in Table 2. Model 1 has the environmental
prioritisation question regressed on gender, education, age, employment
status, income and a wave dummy. Model 2 contains only the three macro-
economic indicators and a wave dummy. Model 3 includes all of these
variables in the one model while model 4 includes interactions between the
macroeconomic indicators and income.
The consistency in the results from the individual-level variables across
the models is noteworthy. Being female and having a higher level of educa-
tion are significantly related to being more willing to prioritise environmen-
tal protection, while being 65+ is correlated with a lower willingness to
Table 2. MLM models for prioritisation of environmental protection.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual variables
Male −0.08** (0.04) . . . . . . −0.09** (0.04) −0.09** (0.04)
Education (elementary or less)
No formal −0.03 (0.09) . . . . . . −0.02 (0.09) −0.02 (0.09)
Incomplete secondary 0.07 (0.05) . . . . . . 0.09* (0.05) 0.09* (0.05)
Complete secondary 0.22*** (0.04) . . . . . . 0.22*** (0.04) 0.22*** (0.04)
Incomplete university 0.50*** (0.07) . . . . . . 0.52*** (0.06) 0.52*** (0.06)
Complete university 0.64*** (0.07) . . . . . . 0.65*** (0.07) 0.65*** (0.07)
Age (18–24)
25–34 0.04 (0.06) . . . . . . 0.05 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06)
35–44 0.09 (0.07) . . . . . . 0.10 (0.06) 0.10 (0.07)
45–54 0.04 (0.08) . . . . . . 0.05 (0.08) 0.05 (0.08)
55–64 −0.00 (0.10) . . . . . . −0.00 (0.10) 0.00 (0.10)
65+ −0.06 (0.13) . . . . . . −0.05 (0.13) −0.05 (0.13)
Employment status (full time
employed)
Part-time employed 0.05 (0.06) . . . . . . 0.05 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06)
Self-employed 0.05 (0.07) . . . . . . 0.05 (0.07) 0.06 (0.07)
Retired −0.05 (0.07) . . . . . . −0.04 (0.07) −0.04 (0.07)
Housework −0.05 (0.05) . . . . . . −0.04 (0.05) −0.04 (0.05)
Student 0.09* (0.05) . . . . . . 0.11** (0.05) 0.10* (0.05)
Unemployed −0.20*** (0.04) . . . . . . −0.13*** (0.04) −0.14*** (0.04)
Other 0.01 (0.08) . . . . . . 0.02 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08)
Income 0.00 (0.01) . . . . . . −0.00 (0.01) 0.05 (0.05)
Macro-economic variables:
Unemployment . . . . . . −0.08*** (0.02) −0.08*** (0.03) −0.07** (0.03)
Unemployment*income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.00 (0.00)
GDP growth . . . . . . 0.02 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.06)
GDP growth*income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.00 (0.01)
GDP PPP PC (Per 1000) . . . . . . 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
GDP PPP PC *Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.00 (0.00)
Wave 6 −0.14 (0.13) −0.13 (0.21) −0.14 (0.19) −0.14 (0.19)
Constant (individual) 0.10 (0.13) 0.37 (0.96) 0.17 (0.84) −0.10 (0.85)
Country-level variance 0.12 (0.03) 0.21 (0.27) 0.23 (0.23) 0.24 (0.24)
Observations 44,315 44,315 44,315 44,315
Number of groups 20 20 20 20
Log likelihood −20,118 −20,213 −19,995 −19,991
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
For Gender, education, age and unemployment status, those who responded ‘don’t know’, ‘missing’ ‘no
answer’ or ‘not applicable’ have been grouped together and included as a standalone category, though
their coefficients are not displayed.
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prioritise environmental protection, though this is not statistically signifi-
cant. The unemployed are far less likely than those in full-time employment
to prioritise environmental protection at the p < 0.01 level, and there is some
indication that students are the most environmentally disposed. Income
levels have no effect, which challenges the idea that changing individual
wealth can explain environmental protection preferences.
Turning to the macroeconomic variables, an increase in unemployment
rates is associated with lower support for environmental protection with
a p < 0.01 in models 2 and 3 with a coefficient of −0.08. As a very visible
economic indicator, this provides support for the adverse effect of harsh
economic circumstances on prioritising environmental protection. However,
while changes in growth rates and GDP PPP PC are, as hypothesised,
positively associated with the dependent variable, this relationship is not
statistically significant. Given the steep line found in Figure 2, one may
wonder why this is not replicated here. Table A3 in the online appendix
sheds more light on this, depicting models excluding the unemployment
variable. In these models, the GDP PPP PC variable appears as statistically
significant with a higher magnitude, though both the wave dummy variable
and the individual constant are also statistically significant. Thus, the initial
appearance of a relationship appears to be spurious due to omitted variable
bias. Such findings mirror the results at the individual level with both
individual- and macro-level unemployment being significant predictors,
whereas individual-level incomes and macro-level growth rates are not.
Thus, I accept H1a while rejecting H1b and H1c. Finally, in model 4 none
of the macro-economic and individual income interactions are statistically
significant, and thus I reject H2a and H2b.
To indicate the magnitude of these effects, and based on model 3 in the
previous table, Figure 3 displays the predicated probabilities for prioritising
environmental protection under different unemployment rates keeping all
other variables at their mean values. Under an unemployment rate of 3.5%,
there is a 62% probability of prioritising environmental protection, whereas,
when the unemployment rate is at 12.5%, the probability drops to 45% and the
confidence intervals between these two estimates have stopped overlapping.
While the probabilities further decrease at unemployment rates of 17.5% and
21.5%, the confidence intervals around these estimates are quite large.
Robustness
I carried out a number of robustness tests. Firstly, I ran models 3 and 4 from
Table 2 multiple times in which each country from the sample was omitted
once to check whether one specific country may be driving the macro-level
results. At the macro-level, changing growth rates and GDP PPP PC remain
statistically non-significant at the p < 0.05 level in each case. Unemployment
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retains its statistical significance in each case, though when Spain is excluded,
the significance level changes from p < 0.01 to p < 0.05 albeit with the
magnitude of the coefficient increasing to −0.10. As for the individual level
variables, Spain appears to be suppressing the impact of being a student on
support for environmental protection as when Spain is excluded – relative to
the baseline of those in fulltime employment – the significance levels changes
from p < 0.10 to p < 0.01 with the magnitude of the coefficient increasing to
0.12. Using this procedure for model 4 in which interaction effects are
introduced, the only notable difference is when Spain is removed from the
model: the unemployment-income interaction term becomes significant at
the p < 0.05 level with a magnitude of −0.01. However, such significance is
not robust to removing a sizeable number of countries in addition to Spain
and thus a null result for this interaction term would appear to be best and
most robust conclusion.
I next examined whether the effect of income may be non-linear by using
income quintiles as a categorical variable instead of using income deciles as
a continuous variable. As can be seen in Table A4 in the online appendix, the
effect of income remains statistically non-significant. Relatedly, due to the
measurement issue with the income variable, in Table A5 in the online
appendix I instead use subjective social class – having to drop both Mexico
and New Zealand as for neither country was this question asked in wave 5.
Figure 3. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for prioritisation of
environmental protection under different unemployment rates.
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The lower/working class are less likely to prioritise the environment than the
other classes, though at a statistically non-significant level. Table A6 in the
online appendix adds in the percentage of government members who are
members of left parties as a test of elite cues.9 However, the macro-economic
variables behave the same and the variable is not statistically significant.
Finally, in the main analysis I had coded ‘don’t know’, ‘no response’ or ‘other’
responses for the dependent variable in the analysis as missing. As an
additional check, I ran the models from Table 2 where the dependent
variable was still coded 1 if individuals prioritised environment protection,
but the 0 category was recoded so that it included all those who did not
explicitly choose to prioritise environmental protection.10 These results are
shown in Table A7 in the online appendix. Apart from gender, which is
statistically non-significant, using this alternative iteration of the dependent
variables does not substantially change anything.
Conclusion
I set out to examine the effects of the Great Recession on the prioritisation of
environmental protection. Namely, I sought to test not only whether dra-
matically worsening economic circumstances may have been responsible for
a deterioration in environmental protections preferences – and, if so, which
economic indicator they were most sensitive to – but also whether the
recession altered the way in which income levels relate to support for
environmental protection.
There is no compelling evidence to suggest that the recession changed the
way in which individual wealth relates to prioritisation of environmental
protection, but measurement issues with the income variable could influence
this finding. While the results demonstrate a lack of an effect between
changing growth levels or GDP PPP PC and environmental protection
prioritisation, they show an extremely strong and robust relationship at the
aggregate level between decreases in such support and increasing unemploy-
ment levels. Given the spread of countries across different world regions in
this study, including both countries where unemployment rates increased
and others where they decreased during this period, this makes a key con-
tribution to the literature: support for the prioritisation of environmental
protection increased when unemployment rates went down and decreased
when unemployment rates went up.
This finding on the relationship between environmental protection and
unemployment rates follows the same pattern that researchers found when
examining the impact of the recession on attitudes to climate change/global
warming. It also provides empirical evidence to suggest that Scruggs and
Benegal (2012) were correct to prioritise using unemployment rates instead
of economic growth in their models. The null effect of growth contrasts with
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the findings of Shum (2012), but there are possible explanations for this.
Firstly, the environmental topic differed as Shum was investigating climate
change, but the expression also differed as he looked at how worried respon-
dents were about the issue rather than their prioritisation of it. Additionally,
given my finding here that not including unemployment rates may lead to
omitted variable bias and the mistaken attribution of significance to other
macro-economic indicators, it is possible that Shum’s results may have been
affected by his using economic growth as his only macro-economic indicator
and not controlling for changing unemployment rates.
A final comparison is with the results of the individual-level panel data
studies that found null relationships between changing economic conditions
and environmental indicators (Mildenberger and Leiserowitz 2017, Kenny
2018a). While my contribution demonstrates the strong relationship
between changing unemployment rates and prioritisation of environmental
protection, its design cannot investigate the mechanism behind this. It is
possible that this is an indirect relationship that works through altering the
content of elite discourse and media content in such a way that crowds out
environmental issues which then, in turn, affects environmental attitudes.
Learning from these findings, future research should pay greater atten-
tion to justifying the economic indicators used to tackle this and related
questions. In particular, the results suggest that the unemployment rate is
the most relevant indicator, but more work is required to investigate the
mechanism through which higher unemployment rates affects the prior-
itisation of environmental protection. As the required solutions to tackling
environmental problems have traditionally required trade-offs with eco-
nomic activity, these findings present a challenge for maintaining support
for action on environmental issues during periods of serious economic
difficulties when unemployment rates are rising. While the increasing cost-
efficiency of renewable energies may lessen the perceived tension between
economic stability and environmental protection, such a perceived tension
may still take some time to lessen. There are already indications from
Sweden that this is possible and that the increased prevalence of ecological
modernisation discourse can alter this relationship (Harring et al. 2011). In
the absence of such a delinking, my results point to the importance of
tackling environmental protection during periods of low unemployment
when public support for such initiatives is likely to be highest. This builds
on previous research that also points to the importance of the timing of
environmental policy initiatives (Benegal and Scruggs 2016). Furthermore,
if policymakers wish to manage the economic costs of environmental
protection without losing public support, these results also suggest that




1. Calculated using unemployment rates.
2. Surveys available for each year in this period except 1979 and 1981.
3. Calculated by dividing household income by the number of individuals living
in the household.
4. Those who are under 18 have been excluded for comparative purposes as they
are present in some countries in some waves but not present in all countries in
all waves.
5. For all of the individual-level variables, other than household income,
responses that are coded as ‘don’t know’, ‘missing’ ‘no answer’ or ‘not applic-
able’ have been grouped together and included as a standalone category. This
prevents the decrease in sample size that would happen if I treated these as
missing. While included in the analysis, I do not display them in the tables.
6. Utilising weights provided that weight the data to be nationally representative
within each country and applying additional weights to ensure that each
country is counted as having the same overall number of respondents in the
comparative analysis. I used such weights in all subsequent analysis.
7. Some countries allowed ‘don’t know’ and/or ‘other’ responses, whereas others
did not. For measuring within country change, some countries also allowed
such responses in one wave but not the other, though this may also reflect
different coding practices on what coders should record when respondents do
not choose a priority. This is why I have chosen this coding. Table A1 in the
online appendix displays the responses to this question by country and wave
when all of these categories are included.
8. Table A2 in the online appendix provides the results with the alternative
approach.
9. This analysis involved a subset of 16 of the countries for which this data was
available.
10. With the exception of the eight people in the dataset for which data is coded as
‘missing’ as one does not know the reason why this data is missing.
Acknowledgments
I thank Michael Biggs, Geoff Evans, Stephen Fisher, Rob Johns and James Tilley as
well as three anonymous reviewers for providing helpful feedback on previous drafts
that greatly improved this work. Previous versions were presented at the 2017 annual
conference of the European Political Science Association and the 2018 annual
conference of the American Political Science Association and I am very grateful for
feedback received at these meetings.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding





Abou-Chadi, T. and Kayser, M., 2017. It’s not easy being green: why voters punish
parties for environmental policies during economic downturns. Electoral Studies,
45, 201–207. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.10.009
Almunia, M., et al., 2010. From great depression to great credit crisis: similarities,
differences and lessons. Economic Policy, 25 (62), 219–265. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
0327.2010.00242.x
Anderson, B., Böhmelt, T., and Ward, H., 2017. Public opinion and environmental
policy output: a cross-national analysis of energy policies in Europe.
Environmental Research Letters, 12 (11). doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa8f80
Benegal, S. and Scruggs, L., 2016. Economic conditions and public opinion on
climate change. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science. doi:10.1093/
acrefore/9780190228620.013.310
Borges, W., et al., 2013. The emerging political economy of austerity in Britain.
Electoral Studies, 32 (3), 396–403. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.05.020
Brulle, R., Carmichael, J., and Craig Jenkins, J., 2012. Shifting public opinion on
climate change: an empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over
climate change in the U.S., 2002–2010. Climatic Change, 114 (2), 169–188.
doi:10.1007/s10584-012-0403-y
Buttel, F., 1975. The environmental movement: consensus, conflict, and change.
Journal of Environmental Education, 7 (1), 53–63. doi:10.1080/
00958964.1975.9941518
Carmichael, J. and Brulle, R., 2017. Elite cues, media coverage, and public concern: an
integrated path analysis of public opinion on climate change, 2001–2013.
Environmental Politics, 26 (2), 232–252. doi:10.1080/09644016.2016.1263433
Clarke, H., et al., 2009. Performance politics and the British voter. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Clarke, H., et al., 2016. Austerity and political choice in Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Conroy, S. and Emerson, T., 2014. A tale of trade-offs: the impact of macro-economic
factors on environmental concern. Journal of Environmental Management, 145,
88–93. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2014.05.033
Cooper, M., 2014. Cut adrift: families in insecure times. Berkeley, California:
University of California Press.
Dalton, R. and Rohrschneider, R., 2015. Environmental concerns during a time of
duress: an introduction. Environmental Politics, 24 (4), 523–529. doi:10.1080/
09644016.2015.1023577
Daniels, D., et al., 2013. Public opinion on environmental policy in the United States.
In: M. Kraft and S. Kamieniecki, eds. The Oxford handbook of U.S. environmental
policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 461–486.
Donnelly, M. and Pop-Eleches, G., 2018. Income measures in cross-national surveys:
problems and solutions. Political Science Research and Methods, 6 (2), 355–363.
doi:10.1017/psrm.2016.40
Downs, A., 1972. Up and down with ecology: the ‘issue-attention cycle.’. The Public
Interest, 28, 38–50.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 955
Duch, R. and Taylor, M., 1993. Postmaterialism and the economic condition.
American Journal of Political Science, 37 (3), 747–779. doi:10.2307/2111573
Dunlap, R., 1991. Trends in public opinion toward environmental issues:
1965–1990. Society & Natural Resources, 4 (3), 285–312. doi:10.1080/
08941929109380761
Dunlap, R. and Emmet Jones, R., 2002. Environmental concern: conceptual and
measurement issues. In: R. Dunlap and W. Michelson, eds. Handbook of environ-
mental sociology. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 482–524.
Dunlap, R. and York, R., 2008. The globalization of environmental concern and the
limits of the postmaterialist values explanation: evidence from four multinational
surveys. Sociological Quarterly, 49 (3), 529–563. doi:10.1111/j.1533-
8525.2008.00127.x
The Economist, 2016. An Augean stable; economic data in Argentina. The
Economist, 418 (8976). https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21692915-gov
ernment-rebuilding-its-discredited-statistics-institute-augean-stable
Eurobarometer, 2009. Europeans’ attitudes towards climate change: special eurobar-
omter 313/wave 71.1. Brussels: European Commission.
Franzen, A. and Vogl, D., 2013. Two decades of measuring environmental attitudes:
a comparative analysis of 33 countries. Global Environmental Change, 23 (5),
1001–1008. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.03.009
Gifford, R. and Nilsson, A., 2014. Personal and social factors that influence
pro-environmental concern and behaviour: a review. International Journal of
Psychology, 49 (3), 141–157. doi:10.1002/ijop.12034
Goldsmith, A., Veum, J., and Darity, W., 1996. The psychological impact of unem-
ployment and joblessness. The Journal of Socio-economics, 25 (3), 333–358.
doi:10.1016/S1053-5357(96)90009-8
Harring, N., Jagers, S., and Martinsson, J., 2011. Explaining ups and downs in the
public’s environmental concern in Sweden: the effects of ecological moderniza-
tion, the economy, and the media. Organization & Environment, 24 (4), 388–403.
doi:10.1177/1086026611420300
Hurrell, A., 2007. On global order: power, values and the constitution of international
society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Inglehart, R., 1983. The persistence of materialist and post-materialist value orienta-
tions: comments on Van Deth’s analysis. European Journal of Political Research, 11
(1), 81–91. doi:10.1111/ejpr.1983.11.issue-1
Inglehart, R., 2008. Changing values amongWestern publics from 1970 to 2006.West
European Politics, 31 (1–2), 130–146. doi:10.1080/01402380701834747
Inglehart., R., et al., 2015. World Values survey longitudinal data v.20150418. World
values survey association. Madrid: JD Systems Institute.
Jones, R. and Dunlap, R., 1992. The social bases of environmental concern: have they
changed over time? Rural Sociology, 57 (1), 28–47. doi:10.1111/j.1549-0831.1992.
tb00455.x
Kachi, A., Bernauer, T., and Gampfer, R., 2015. Climate policy in hard times: are the
pessimists right? Ecological Economics, 114, 227–241. doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2015.03.002
Kahn, M. and Kotchen, M., 2011. Business cycle effects on concern about climate
change: the chilling effect of recession. Climate Change Economics, 2 (3), 257–273.
doi:10.1142/S2010007811000292
Kayser, M. and Peress, M., 2016. The buck stops over there? Benchmarking elections
in the open economy. In: J. Vowles and G. Xezonakis, eds. Globalization and
956 J. KENNY
domestic politics: parties, elections, and public opinion. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 89–112.
Kenny, J., 2018a. Environmental protection preferences under strain: an analysis of
the impact of changing individual perceptions of economic and financial condi-
tions on environmental public opinion during economic crisis. Journal of
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 28 (1), 105–124. doi:10.1080/
17457289.2017.1395884
Kenny, J., 2018b. The role of economic perceptions in influencing views on climate
change: an experimental analysis with British respondents. Climate Policy, 18 (5),
581–592. doi:10.1080/14693062.2017.1414026
Kollmuss, A. and Agyeman, J., 2002. Mind the gap: why do people behave envir-
onmentally and what are the barriers to pro-environmental behaviour.
Environmental Education Research, 8 (3), 239–260. doi:10.1080/
13504620220145401
Krosnick, J., et al., 2006. The origins and consequences of democratic citizens’ policy
agendas: a study of popular concern about global warming. Climatic Change, 77
(1), 7–43. doi:10.1007/s10584-006-9068-8
Krosnick, J. and MacInnis, B. 2012. Trends in American public opinion on global
warming policies between 2010 and 2012. https://woodsinstitute.stanford.edu/
system/files/publications/GW-Policy-Trend-2010-2012-1.pdf
Lane, P. and Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., 2011. The cross-country incidence of the global
crisis. IMF Economic Review, 59 (1), 77–110. doi:10.1057/imfer.2010.12
Lee, T.M., et al., 2015. Predictors of public climate change awareness and risk
perception around the world. Nature Climate Change, 5 (November),
1014–1019. doi:10.1038/nclimate2728
Mildenberger, M. and Leiserowitz, A., 2017. Public opinion on climate change: is
there an economy-environment tradeoff? Environmental Politics, 26 (5), 801–824.
doi:10.1080/09644016.2017.1322275
Newman, T. and Fernandes, R., 2016. A re-assessment of factors associated with
environmental concern and behavior using the 2010 general social survey.
Environmental Education Research, 22 (2), 153–175. doi:10.1080/
13504622.2014.999227
Nordhaus, T. and Shellenberger, M., 2009. Apocalypse fatigue: losing the public on
climate change. Yale Environment, 360. www.e360.yale.edu/feature/apocalypse_
fatigue_losing_the_public_on_climate_change/2210/
Pugliese, A. and Ray, J., 2009. A heated debate: global attitudes toward climate
change. Harvard International Review, 31 (3), 64–68.
Ratter, B., Philipp, K., and von Storch, H., 2012. Between hype and decline: recent
trends in public perception of climate change. Environmental Science & Policy, 18,
3–8. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2011.12.007
Rohrschneider, R., Miles, M., and Peffley, M., 2014. The structure and sources of
global environmental attitudes. In: R. Dalton and C. Welzel, eds. The civic culture
transformed: from allegiant to assertive citizens. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 193–212.
Scruggs, L. and Benegal, S., 2012. Declining public concern about climate change: can
we blame the Great Recession? Global Environmental Change, 22 (2), 505–515.
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.01.002
Shum, R., 2012. Effects of economic recession and local weather on climate change
attitudes. Climate Policy, 12 (1), 38–49. doi:10.1080/14693062.2011.579316
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 957
Singer, M., 2011. Who says ‘it’s the economy’? Cross-national and cross-individual
variance in the salience of economic performance. Comparative Political Studies,
44 (3), 284–312. doi:10.1177/0010414010384371
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2011. The Global Social
Crisis: Report on the World Social Situation 2011. New York: United Nations.
World Bank, 2015. World bank open data. World Bank. Available from: https://data.
worldbank.org/
958 J. KENNY
